G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC of the PHILS., petitioner vs. RORIDEL O. MOLINA, respondents
FACTS:
Respondent filed a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina, the latter being psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual.
The parties were legally married in 1985 and out of said marriage was born a son. They were separated-in-fact for more than 3 years. CA declared the marriage void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not subject marriage is void ab initio due to psychological incapacity.
RULING:
No. The marriage subsists and remains valid.
Psychological incapacity muct be characterized by a) GRAVITY; b) JURIDICAL ANTECEDENCE and c) INCURABILITY.
In the present case, there is no clear showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to be more of a difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect in the performance of maritime obligations.
Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes pscychological incapacity. There was no showing of the existence of the 3 characteristics above mentioned.
The following are guidelines set forth by the SC for the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
2.) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
a) medically or clinically identified;
b) alleged in the complaint;
c) sufficiently proven by experts;
d) clearly explained in the decision.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be exisiting at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
6.) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68-71 of the Family Code as regards husband and wife as well as Articles 220-221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.
7.) Interpretatiosn given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by by our courts.
8.) The trial court must order the Prosecuting Attorney or the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State.
Showing posts with label CASE DIGEST. Show all posts
Showing posts with label CASE DIGEST. Show all posts
Thursday, March 6, 2008
CRIMINAL LAW - Frustrated/ Attempted
GR. 12155, February 2, 1917
UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee vs. PROTASIO EDUAVE, defendant-appellant
FACTS:
Defendant was charged of the crime of rape resulting to the pregnancy of Ms. X who happens to be the daughter of his paramour. Incensed, defendant rushed to the girl and struck here from behind, in part at least, with a sharp bolo producing a frightful gash in the lumbar region and slightly to the side 8 1/2 inches long and 2 inches deep severing all of the muscles and tissues of that part.
There was no question that defendant was guilty. The only dilemma is the precise crime of which he should be convicted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused should be convicted of frustrated murder.
RULING:
Yes, accused should be convicted of frustrated murder.
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the prepetrator. (See Art 3, Revide Penal Code)
The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment all of the acts have been performed which should result in the consummated crime. While in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all the acts which should produce the crime.
In case of an attempt, the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention of outside causes before the subjective phase is passed.
In case of frustrated crimes, the subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing throught he subjective phase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the causes independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due to something beyond his control.
UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee vs. PROTASIO EDUAVE, defendant-appellant
FACTS:
Defendant was charged of the crime of rape resulting to the pregnancy of Ms. X who happens to be the daughter of his paramour. Incensed, defendant rushed to the girl and struck here from behind, in part at least, with a sharp bolo producing a frightful gash in the lumbar region and slightly to the side 8 1/2 inches long and 2 inches deep severing all of the muscles and tissues of that part.
There was no question that defendant was guilty. The only dilemma is the precise crime of which he should be convicted.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused should be convicted of frustrated murder.
RULING:
Yes, accused should be convicted of frustrated murder.
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the prepetrator. (See Art 3, Revide Penal Code)
The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment all of the acts have been performed which should result in the consummated crime. While in the former there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of performing all the acts which should produce the crime.
In case of an attempt, the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention of outside causes before the subjective phase is passed.
In case of frustrated crimes, the subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while he was passing throught he subjective phase. The crime, however, is not consummated by reason of the causes independent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary to commit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was due to something beyond his control.
Constitutional Law - FREEDOM OF SPEECH
G.R. L-32717, November 26, 1970
Amelito R. Mutuc, petitioner vs. COMELEC, respondent
Facts:
This is a Special Civil Action for Prohibition filed by Amelito R. Mutuc, a resident of Arayat, Pampanga and candidate for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention.
He alleged that respondent informed him by telegram that his Certificate of Candidacy is given due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. Hence, this case was filed on the premise that said COMELEC order is violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech.
Respondent COMELEC, on the other hand contended that the jingle proposed by petitioner is a recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material under Constitutional Convention Act 2 and hence is subject to confiscation.
Issue:
Whether or not subject COMELEC order is unconstitutional?
Ruling:
Yes. COMELEC is permanently restrained to enforce assailed order.
In unequivocal language, the Constituion prohibits any abridgment of free speech or free press. What respondent did was impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed.
The concept of the Cnstitution as fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government.
Amelito R. Mutuc, petitioner vs. COMELEC, respondent
Facts:
This is a Special Civil Action for Prohibition filed by Amelito R. Mutuc, a resident of Arayat, Pampanga and candidate for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention.
He alleged that respondent informed him by telegram that his Certificate of Candidacy is given due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. Hence, this case was filed on the premise that said COMELEC order is violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech.
Respondent COMELEC, on the other hand contended that the jingle proposed by petitioner is a recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material under Constitutional Convention Act 2 and hence is subject to confiscation.
Issue:
Whether or not subject COMELEC order is unconstitutional?
Ruling:
Yes. COMELEC is permanently restrained to enforce assailed order.
In unequivocal language, the Constituion prohibits any abridgment of free speech or free press. What respondent did was impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed.
The concept of the Cnstitution as fundamental law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government.
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